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THE SCOPE OF PRNATE SECURITIES LITIGATION: IN
SEARCH OF LIABILITY STANDARDS FOR
SECONDARY DEFENDANTS
jill E. Fisch*
Recent federal court decisions have struggled to apply the Supreme
Cowt's decision in Central Bank v. First Interstate to determine when
outside professionals should be held liable as primary violators under section
IO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. In keeping with the Court's current
interpretive methodology, Central Bank and its progeny employ a textualist
approach. In this Article, Professor Fisch argues that literal textualism is an
inappropriate approach for interpreting the federal securities laws generally
and misguided in light of legislative developments post-dating the Central
Bank decision. Instead, Professor Fisch advocates an approach that weighs
Congress's recent endorsement of liability for outside professionals against the
potential for litigation abuses perceived by the Central Bank Court. The
Article concludes that recent federal decisions have been unduly restrictive in
their interpretation of section 1 O(b) liability, and suggests that courts give
greater consideration to the nature of the professional-client relationship and
the role of liability in furthering the integrity of the securities markets.
INTRODUCTION

Twenty-five years ago, at the urging of then-SEC Chairman William
Cary, the Supreme Court recognized an implied private right of action
for federal proxy fraud in ]I. Case v. Borak.l Under Cary's direction, the
SEC advocated a broad remedial interpretation of the federal securities
laws and an activist role for the courts in implementing the legislation
an approach that reached frui tion in Borak.

More recently the fede ral

courts have retreated from the activism espoused by Cary in favor of a
textualist approach. Decisions such as Central Bank v. First Interstate2 rele
gate the legacy of William Cary to an almost forgotten era in which the
federal judiciary was viewed as capable of weighing policy considerations,
evaluating the recommendations of an expert administrative agency, as
certaining the regulatory obj ec tives of a statutory scheme , and, ultimately,
utilizing these factors to structure legal rules. 3
There are reasons to question the value of textualism in interpreting
the federal securities laws , however. In particular, a strict textual reading
of the securities laws may frustrate the regulatory balance Congress ere* Professor of Law, Fordham Law School. I am grateful to Steve The! and my mother
for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
l. 377 U.S. 426 ( 1964).
2. 5ll u.s. 164 (1994).
3. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et a!., Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and
the Federal System 839 (4th ed. 1996) (describing Borak as the "high-water mark of judicial
implication of remedies").
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ated by promulgating the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of

1998.

1995

More

broadly, these two statutes suggest a need to revisit Cary's conception of
the j udicial role in section 1 0 ( b) 4 lawmaking.
In

Central Bank, the Court concluded that section 10 ( b) does not

permit liability to be imposed for aiding and abetting federal securities
fraud, but it left open the potential scope of primary liability for secon
dary defendants.5 The Court offered no guidance as to the appropriate
circumstances for the imposition of primary liability; it m erely observed,
in a somewhat cryptic statement, that secondary defendants, such as ac
countants, lawyers , and banks, could, under certain circumstances, be
held liable as primary violators. 6
Traditionally the federal courts have played a substantial role in
crafting the scope of liability under the federal securities laws. This tradi
tion continues as the courts struggle to apply the Supreme Court' s deci
sion in

Central Bank in an effort to determine the liability exposure of

outside professionals7 in private securities fraud litigation under section
10 ( b) of the Securities Exchange Act of

1 9348 ( the Exchange Act) and

SEC Rule 1 0b-5.9 Two recent decisions illustrate the problems that courts
face in interpreting the language of
In

Klein

v.

Central Bank.

Boyd, a panel of the Third Circuit held that a securities

lawyer who significantly participates in the preparation of client disclo
sure documents can thereby become an author of the documents . 1 0 If

4. Securities Exchange Act of 1934§ 10 (b), 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1994).
5. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 177 (1994).
6. See id. at 191 ("The absence of§ 10(b) aiding and abetting liability does not mean
that secondary actors in the securities markets are always free from liability under the
securities Acts. Any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs
a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a
purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under 10b-5,
assuming all of the requirements for primary liability under Rule lOb-5 are met.").
7. This Article will only address the liability of outside professionals or secondary
defendants. Cf. Mishkin v. Ageloff, No. 97 Civ. 2690 LAP, 1998 WL 651065 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
23, 1998), slip op. at 17 n.12 (suggesting that the scope of primary liability for secondary
actors may differ from that applicable to principals). For the purposes of this Article,
secondary defendants include attorneys, accountants, banks, investment banks, and other
professionals who render services in connection with securities disclosure. Some courts
and commentators have sought to distinguish between these professionals in formulating
liability standards based upon the nature of the services performed. See, e.g., Lewis D.
Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Liabilities of Lawyers and Accountants Under Rule lOb-5,
53 Bus. Law. 1157 (1998) (describing developing patterns of liability standards imposed in
cases involving accountants and those involving lawyers). This Article will not address the
question of whether courts should develop different standards for different types of
professionals.
8. 15 u.s.c. § 78 (b) (1994).
9. 17 C.F.R.§ 240.10b-5 (1998).
10. [1997-1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 'l[ 90,136, 90,317 (3d Cir. Feb. 12,
1998), vacated on grant of rehearing, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 4121 (Mar. 9, 1998), at 90,325
(holding that a defendant's participation in the creation of a fraudulent statement may
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the documents are fraudulent, the lawyer's conduct may be a sufficient
basis upon which to impose liability as a primary violator for federal se
curities fraud. Under this approach, a secondary defendant could incur
liability for his or her participation in the creation of fraudulent state
ments issued by someone else.11
The Second Circuit's approach has been different. In its most recent
decision to address the issue, Wright v. Emst & Young l 2 the Second Cir
cuit employed a narrower standard for liability, 1 3 holding that "a secon
dary actor cannot incur primary liability under the [Securities Exchange]
Act for a statement not attributed to that actor at the time of its dissemi
nation."14 The court rejected the argument that a defendant could be
liable based upon his or her substantial participation in the creation of
fraudulent documents, reasoning that any conduct by the defendant
short of actually making a false and misleading statement was merely aid
ing and abetting, rather than a basis for primary liability.15
,

The disagreement between the Klein court and the Wright court
stems from differing interpretations of Central Bank. More importantly,
these decisions share an unduly restrictive interpretive approach-an ef
fort to determine the scope of liability from the text of section lO(b).
The appropriate application of Central Bank has been complicated, how
ever, by subsequent legislative developments: the enactment of two
amendments to the federal securities laws that reform private civil litiga
tion. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 199516 (the Reform
Act) dealt with perceived abuses by revising a variety of procedural and
substantive aspects of private litigation, including explicit modification of
the liability standards for secondary defendantsP More recently, the Se
curities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 199818 (the Uniform Stan
dards Act) preempted state statutory and common law securities fraud
render him liable as a primary violator even if an investor is unable to attribute the
statement to the defendant).
11. The Third Circuit subsequently vacated the panel decision and ordered
reargument en bane. See Klein v. Boyd, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 4121 (Mar. 9, 1998).
Before the case could be reargued, the parties settled, depriving the Third Circuit of the
opportunity to resolve the scope of liability for secondary defendants. See Klein v. Boyd,
Nos. 97-1143 and 97-1261 (Nov. 12, 1998) (order of the Third Circuit Clerk dismissing the
case with prejudice in accordance with the agreement of the parties).
12. 152 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 1998).
13. Cf. SEC v. First jersey Securities, 101 F.3d 1450, 1471 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that
"primary liability may be imposed 'not only on persons who made fraudulent
misrepresentations but also on those who had knowledge of the fraud and assisted in its
preparation."' (citation omitted)).
14. Wright, 152 F.3d at 175.
15. See id. (distinguishing between the "bright line" test and the "substantial
participation" test).
16. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(a) et seq.
(1994 & Supp. I 1995)).
17. See infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
18. Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998).
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claims by requiring class actions involving nationally traded securities to
be brought exclusively in federal court under uniform federal stan
dards.19 Although lower courts struggling with the development of liabil
ity standards for secondary defendants have sought to reconcile their con
clusions with Central Bank, they have given little attention to the potential
impact of these statutes upon the basis for Central Bank's holding.
The reconciliation effort illustrates a key tension in the interpreta
tion of section lO(b)-the tension between the application of a Supreme
Court precedent interpreting a federal statute and subsequent legislation
that relates to the subject of the decision without directly addressing it.
Because section lO(b) jurisprudence reflects an ongoing lawmaking dia
logue between Congress and the federal courts, the current textualist
methodology of statutory interpretation provides an inadequate tool for
addressing this tension. The recent politically charged congressional in
cursions into the field of private securities litigation provide further rea
son to question the traditional orthodoxy of legislative deference.20
This Article begins by summarizing, in Part I, the Supreme Court's
decision in Central Bank and explaining how the lower courts have at
tempted to apply Central Bank to determine the scope of primary liability
for outside professionals under section 10(b). In Part II, the Article iden
tifies two important legislative developments that postdate Central Bank:
the adoption of the Reform Act and the Uniform Standards Act. The
Article then analyzes, in Part III, the methodology of Central Bank, and
argues that the textualist interpretation espoused by the Court in that
case is inappropriate. Instead, the Article advocates a broader approach,
in which courts consider, among other things, the effect of the recent
statutes and the policy objectives identified by Congress in those statutes.
In Part IV, the Article applies its suggested approach to the problem of
delineating the appropriate scope of primary liability. The Article argues
that the statutes expressly endorse the continued importance of liability
for outside professionals while, at the same time, instituting reforms ad
dressed at the litigation abuses perceived by the Central Bank Court. Ac
cordingly, the Article concludes that recent decisions have been unduly
restrictive in their reading of section lO(b) liability and advocates more
fidelity to the statutory purpose. The Article suggests that courts should
give greater consideration to the nature of the professional's relationship
19. See, e.g., Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption
of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1998) (describing scope of
Uniform Standards Act).
20. See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, Chasing the Rogue Professional After the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 50 SMU L. Rev. 91, 93 n.6 (1996) (describing
lobbying efforts for securities litigation reform and observing that the coalition lobbying
for the legislation "amassed an early $12 million war chest, mostly from the accounting
profession"); Anthony Q. Fletcher, Note, Curing Crib Death: Emerging Growth
Companies, Nuisance Suits, and Congressional Proposals for Securities Litigation Reform,
32 Harv.]. on Legis. 493 n.2 (1995) (describing coalition formed to lobby for litigation
reform under the name Committee to Eliminate Abusive Securities Suits (CEASE)).
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with his or her client and the role of liability in enhancing the function
ing of professionals as gatekeepers and furthering the integrity of the se
curities markets.
I. THE PROBLEM OF LIABILITY OF OUTSIDE PROFESSIONALS: THE LEGACY
OF CENTRAL BANK

A.

The Central Bank Decision

In Central Bank, the Supreme Court concluded that section 1 0 (b) 21
does not permit liability to be imposed upon those who aid and abet fed
eral securities fraud.22 The decision came with little warning-courts
and commentators had widely accepted the validity of aiding and abet
ting liability. 23 The petitioner in Central Bank did not even raise the issue
until the Court issued a sua sponte order requiring the parties to address
it.24 Nonetheless, after rejecting the analysis of every lower court to con
sider the question,25 the Court concluded that, because section lO(b) did
not contain the terms "aiding and abetting," the scope of the statute did
not extend beyond primary liability.26
21. Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or approptiate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
22. See Central Bank v. First Interstate, 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994).
23. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An
Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 Colum. L. Rev.
749, 760 (1995) (explaining that until Central Bank, "no court had suggested any doubt"
that section lO(b) should be interpreted to impose liability for aiding and abetting
securities fraud).
24. See id. See also Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 194-95 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the Court for reaching out to overturn a body of settled law).
25. See Brief of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Amicus Curiae, in
Central Bank v. First Interstate, 511 U.S. 164 (1994), available in Lexis, 1992 U.S. Briefs
854 [hereinafter City Bar Amicus Brief in Central Bank] . The extensive lower court
decisions had refined a test for secondary liability that required: 1) the existence of a
primary violation; 2) scienter by the defendant; and 3) substantial assistance of the
violation by the defendant. See The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Leading Cases, 108
Harv. L. Rev. 139, 362 n.3 (1994) (describing scope of aiding and abetting liability at the
time of the Central Bank decision); see also Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change:
An Equilibrium Analysis, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1055, 1104-05 (1997) (describing legal status of
aiding and abetting liability as in a stable equilibrium prior to Central Bank) .
26. 511 U.S. at 191 (" Because the text of § 10(b) does not prohibit aiding and
abetting, we hold that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit
under§ 10(b).").
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In reaching this result, the Central Bank Court employed a strict tex
tualist approach.27 The Court defended its reliance on the statutory text,
in part, by using a distinction that it had recognized in only one other
case,28 betvveen statutory interpretation issues involving the scope of con
duct prohibited by section lO(b) and questions about the elements of the
liability scheme.29 The Central Bank opinion explained that aiding and
abetting liability involved a scope of conduct issue and that, accordingly,
the text of the statute was controlling.30 Nonetheless, the Court explicitly
stated that outside professionals could still be liable under section 1 0 (b)
as long as the requirements for primary liability were met.31
The Central Bank decision proceeded to buttress its conclusion with
arguments about congressional intent and policy considerations.32 Faced
with congressional silence, the Court refused to infer a broad intention to
supplement primary liability with aiding and abetting liability, either in
section lO(b) or generally throughout the Exchange Act.33 The Court
observed that Congress had made a deliberate choice about the scope of
secondary liability by explicitly creating liability for controlling persons in
section 20.34 In addition, the majority opinion noted that Congress had
enacted the Exchange Act against a regulatory backdrop in which many
state blue sky laws imposed aiding and abetting liability.35 Finally, the
opinion rejected arguments that subsequent Congresses had acquiesced
in or ratified aiding and abetting liability.3 6 The Court was unconvinced
that legislative references to aiding and abetting constituted ratification,
noting that these references were not the product of the formal legisla
tive process.37 The decision also concluded that Congress's failure to
overturn judicial decisions upholding aiding and abetting liability was not
the equivalent of congressional approvai.38
The majority opinion similarly rejected policy arguments that aiding
and abetting liability deters secondary actors from furthering fraudulent
schemes and increases victim compensation.39 The Court warned that it
was precluded from using policy considerations as a basis for overriding
27. See Richard H. Walker & David M. Levine, The Limits of Central Bank's Textualist
Approach-Attempts to Overdraw the Bank Prove Unsuccessful, 26 Hofstra L. Rev. 1, 3
(1997).
28. Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286 (1993).
29. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 172-73.
30. See id. at 177.
31. See id. at 191.
32. 2. See id. at 178-90.
33. See id. at 180-85.
34. See id. at 184. Section 20 imposes liability on "controlling persons," that is, those
who "control any person liable under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or
regulation thereunder." 15 U.S.C.§ 78t(a).
35. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 184.
36. See id. at 186.
37. See id. at 186-87.
38. See id. at 188-90.
39. See id. at 185-87.
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the statutory text.40 Nonetheless, the Court went out of its way to de
scribe why recognition of aiding and abetting liability was inconsistent
with the statutory objectives inasmuch as it would "exact[ ] costs that may
disserve the goals of fair dealing and efficiency in the securities mar
kets."41 The majority opinion explained that secondary liability is often
imposed in an unpredictable manner and that, as a result, secondary de
fendants may suffer undue settlement pressure.42 The opinion also iden
tified federal securities fraud as presenting a danger of vexatious litiga
tion.43 The Court viewed this litigation risk as particularly problematic
for outside professionals because it could cause them to withhold their
services from new and smaller companies or to pass the costs of litigation
on to investors.44
Thus, the task for lower courts after Central Bank has been to define
the circumstances under which secondary defendants meet the require
ments for primary liability. Central Bank offers limited guidance in this
endeavor. The Court's opinion did not address the scope of liability for
secondary defendants. Moreover, although determining when the con
duct of outside professionals violates section lO(b) appears to involve a
scope of conduct question analogous to that in Central Bank, strict textual
ism is of limited value in ascertaining the scope of liability for secondary
defendants.45 Section 10(b) is, of course, silent even with respect to the
imposition of primary liability. If a court nonetheless concludes, as the
federal courts have done consistently, that the statutory text imposes lia
bility upon anyone who uses or employs a manipulative or deceptive de
vice, there are no statutory guidelines as to acceptable defendants. In
cases in which secondary defendants are acting together with and on be
half of a client-issuer, and the relevant disclosures are made by and on
behalf of the client, the text offers no tools for drawing a line between
those who have committed the fraud and those who should be treated as
collateral participants.

40. See id. at 188 ("Policy considerations cannot override our interpretation of the
text and structure of the Act, except to the extent that they may help to show that
adherence to the text and structure would lead to a result 'so bizarre' that Congress could
not have intended it.").
41. See id. at 184.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 189.
44. See id.
45. Indeed, the Central Bank decision itself seems to recognize that the analysis
employed would not be useful in ascertaining the elements of an acknowledged cause of
action. See Robert A. Prentice, Locating that "Indistinct" and "Virtually Nonexistent" Line
Between Primary and Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b), 75 N.C. L. Rev. 691, 712
(1997) (arguing that neither Central Bank's method of analysis nor its holding is relevant to
determining the proper parameters of primary liability).

1300

COL UMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99:1293

B. The Application of Central Bank
Recent decisions have sought to apply Central Bank's reasoning in an
effort to develop liability standards for secondary defendants. Cases at
both ends of the liability spectrum are relatively easy to resolve. Central
Bank expressly endorses the concept of primary liability for outside pro
fessionals who make fraudulent statements. 46 Thus, when a lawyer or ac
countant is sued on the basis of his or her own statements rather than
those of the client, the professional faces primary liability under the stat
ute.47 Such liability may arise, for example, from misrepresentations con
tained in an opinion letter.48 Conversely, Central Bank seems to eliminate
liability based upon pure gatekeeper or whistleblower theories of liability,
in which an outside professional is sued for his or her inaction in failing
to prevent a client's fraud.49 At least in circumstances in which the pro
fessional owes no duty to the victims of the fraud, the failure to act or to
speak is insufficient for the imposition of primary liability.5 0
The cases in between are more troubling. Traditionally, issuers have
engaged outside professionals to assist in the task of preparing the is
suer's disclosure documents. This assistance can take the form of advis
ing the client on disclosure requirements, drafting the necessary docu
mentation, and verifying that the client's disclosure is accurate and
complete.51 In evaluating the potential liability of outside professionals
based upon this role, one possible approach is to adopt a bright line rule
that the client alone is responsible for the contents of its disclosure docu
ments.52 A few courts, such as those in the Second Circuit, have followed
this approach, reasoning that for Central Bank to have any meaning a de46. See supra note 6.
47. See, e.g., McGann v. Ernst & Young, 102 F.3d 390, 397 (9th Cir. 1996)
(concluding that accounting firm could be liable for its fraudulent audit report, which was
included in client's Form 10-K and filed with the SEC). Although pre- Central Bank cases
often termed this secondary liability, Central Bank makes it clear that this characterization
was incorrect. See Prentice, supra note 45, at 707 (explaining that liability for one's own
misrepresentations is primary, not secondary).
48. See, e.g., Kline v. First Western Gov't Sec., 24 F.3d 480, 486-87 (3d Cir. (1994).
49. See Prentice, supra note 45, at 765-66 (explaining why the Central Bank decision
should eliminate whistleblower liability).
50. The decision in SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682
(D.D.C. 1978), is one of the better known examples of a situation in which attorneys were
held responsible for their failure to take action to stop a transaction once they learned of
the use of false financial data. The court did not rely upon the existence of any duty to the
victims as a basis for imposing liability. See id. at 713.
51. See, e.g., Manning Gilbert Warren III, The Primary Liability of Securities Lawyers,
50 SMU L. Rev. 383, 387-90 (1996) (describing the role of the securities lawyer in assisting
a client with the disclosure process).
52. See, e.g., Anixter v. Home-Stake Production Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1226-27 ( lOth Cir.
1996) (adopting this approach, although describing it as "far from a bright line [rule]");
see also Patricia Bianchini, Note, The Statement Someone Else Makes May be Your Own:
Primary Liability Under Section 10(b) After Central Bank, 71 St.John's L. Rev. 767, 786-87
(1997) (criticizing this approach as inconsistent with Central Bank and the intent of
Congress).
·
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fendant must actually make a false and misleading statement rather than
aid someone else.53 This approach is supported both by the text of the
statute and by the concern articulated in Central Bank that the application
of liability standards be sufficiently predictable.54
Other courts, particularly those in the Ninth Circuit, have rejected
the bright line rule in favor of the conclusion that liability can be im
posed upon outside professionals who substantially participate in the dis
closure process, even if the documents prepared do not purport to be
statements by the professionai.55 The Third Circuit panel in Klein v. Boyd
justified this result by explaining that sufficient assistance makes the pro
fessional a co-author of the documents, thereby rendering the profes
sional accountable for misrepresentations or omissions in those docu
ments.5 6 Similarly, courts have reasoned that primary liability may
extend to all members of the "drafting group."57 The SEC has advocated
primary liability for an outside professional who "acting alone or with
others, creates a misrepresentation."58 Under this theory, the secondary
53. See Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717, 720 (2d Cir. 1997). Even under the Second
Circuit approach, a primary violator need not communicate directly with investors.
Rather, liability is appropriate whenever a defendant is the source of a fraudulent
misrepresentation and knows or should know that the misrepresentation will be
communicated to investors. See, e.g., In re Kidder Peabody Securities Litig., 10 F. Supp.
2d 398, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). Related to this is the conclusion that an outside professional
may be primarily liable for fraud committed through his or her direct contacts with
investors. See, e.g., Rubin v. Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn, 143 F.3d 263, 267 (6th Cir. 1998)
(holding that attorney and his law firm could be primarily liable based on "direct contacts"
with the plaintiffs). See also Mishkin v. Ageloff, 1998 WL 651065 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1998),
slip op. at 18 (finding allegations that defendant participated in a fraudulent scheme or
committed a fraudulent act sufficient to state a claim for primary liability where defendant
was a principal actor rather than an outside professional).
54. See Shapiro, 123 F.3d at 720 (defending this approach as providing more
guidance to outside professionals than a rule allowing liability to attach to those who
provide substantial or significant assistance to the representations of others); accord
Anixter, 77 F.3d at 1226.
55. See, e.g., In re Software Toolworks, Inc. Sec. Litig., 38 F.3d 1078, 1090 n.3 (9th
Cir. 1994) (finding accounting firm's significant participation in drafting misleading
letters to the SEC sufficient to support a claim of primary liability); Cashman v. Coopers &
Lybrand, 877 F. Supp. 425, 433 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (holding that primary liability could be
based upon accountant's central role in the drafting and formation of misrepresentations);
In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 970 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that liability
can be based upon an accounting firm's intricate involvement in creating false
documents).
56. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) � 90,136, 90,325.
57. See In re Software Toolworks, Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d 615, 629 (9th Cir. 1994); see
also Murphy v. Hollywood Entertainment Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rev. (CCH) � 99,241, 99,347
(D. Or. 1996) (upholding as sufficient allegations that underwriters were "'direct
participants'" in the alleged wrongdoing by their role in coordinating the offering,
drafting disputed offering documents and conducting a due diligence investigation").
58. Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae 14, in Klein v.
Boyd, Nos. 97-1143, 97-1261 (3d Cir. 1997) (visited Apr. 1, 1999) <http:/I
www.sec.govnews/legal/klein.txt> [hereinafter SEC Amicus Brief in Klein] (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) .
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defendant need not sign or certify the disclosure docume n ts .59 Indeed,
the secondary defendan t's rol e or identity need not even be known to
potential investors; his or her participation is sufficien t.60
Although courts have claimed that this approach is consiste n t with

Central Bank because it only imposes liability upon those who make mis
representations ( as opposed to those who provide substantial assistance ) ,
premising liability upon a professional ' s participation in a collective pro
cess appears perilously close to the liability standard rej ected by

Central

Bank.61 Moreover, even if one accepts the premise that an outside profes
sional ' s participation in th e preparation of fraudulent client disclosure
should result in liability under appropriate circumstances, the difficulties
in applying this approach raise additional concerns. Using this approach,
courts have premised liability upon the degree of the professional ' s par
ticipation, explaining that the professional ' s involvement m us t be "sub
stantial" or "significant." It is virtually impossible, however, to translate
these terms i n to an articulable legal standard by which to quantify the
level of participation necessary for the impositi o n of liability. This creates
several problems.
First, imposing liability upon outside professionals bas e d upon their
level of participation is unpredictable and subj ect to an ad hoc fact-based
evaluation. 62 The Central Bank Court expressly identified an unpredict
able standard of liability for outside professionals as undesirable. 53 Sec
ond, the imposition of liability based upon a professional ' s degree of in
volvement may have the practical effect of punishing h i m or her for
professionally responsible behavior. 64 The purpose of e n gaging securi
ties professionals is to obtain th eir assistance in the preparation of the
required disclosure documents, yet, a professional who diligently assists
the client in preparing these documents is thereby subj ected to liability
59. See, e.g., Carley Capital Group. v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 90,341, 91,635 (D. Ga. 1998) (accepting the standard of liability advocated by the
SEC and concluding that this standard is "consistent with the 'directly or indirectly'
language in Section 10 (b)").
60. See SEC Amicus Brief in Klein, supra note 58, at 8-13 (arguing that a rule
imposing liability only upon defendants who are identified to investors is inconsistent with
Central Bank).
61. See Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717, 720 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Allegations of 'assisting,'
'participating in,' 'complicity in' and similar synonyms . . . all fall within the prohibitive
bar of Central Bank.").
62. The scienter requirement provides insufficient protection against liability due, in
part, to its fact-based nature. In addition to the evidentiary problems posed by a
professional's scienter defense, its imposition requires the defendant to go to trial, thereby
incurring substantial litigation costs. These costs are the source of the settlement pressure
identified by the Court in Central Bank.
63. See Central Bank v. First Interstate, 511 U.S. 164, 188 (1994).
64. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
13, in Klein v. Boyd, Nos. 97-1143, 97-1261 (3d Cir. 1997) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (warning that "it may not be possible for attorneys to satisfy professional standards
of competence without being substantially involved in the drafting process") [hereinafter
City Bar Amicus Brief in Klein].
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precisely because he or she has provided meaningful assistance. Third,
the standard encourages securities professionals to distance themselves
from their client's product by refusing to draft, review, or verify client
statements. This result sacrifices both the client's interests and those of
outside investors who benefit from the involvement of outside profession
als in the preparation process.65
The existing lower court decisions are currently in conflict both as to
the legal standard they articulate and the application of that standard.
However, if the courts were to adopt a rule that imposes liability based
upon some level of participation in the preparation of client disclosure,
the result may be substantially to limit the practical effect of Central Bank
and to apply, in essence, the pre Central Bank liability standards under the
new name of primary liability.66 Apart from the question of whether this
approach conflicts with Central Bank's reading of the statutory text, it
raises concern over the policy considerations identified by the Court in
Central Bank. These policy issues-the lack of predictability, the settle
ment pressure imposed by fact-based liability standards, and the risk of
vexatious litigation-would persist under a substantial participation liabil
ity standard. 67
-

II. RECENT FEDERAL SECURITIES LEGISLATION
In attempting to formulate a test for when outside professionals
should be held liable for federal securities fraud, it is necessary to expand
the analysis beyond Central Bank. Subsequent to Central Bank, Congress
adopted two significant amendments to the federal securities laws that
specifically address private civil litigation. With respect to all three factors
identified by the Central Bank decision-statutory text, legislative intent,
and policy considerations-the amendments offer additional insight
about the appropriate scope of liability for secondary defendants.
The statutes directly addressed the perceptions of abusive and vexa
tious litigation that animated the Central Bank decision. In 1995, Con65. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 51, at 396 (arguing that investors rely upon the
lawyer's work in making investment decisions).
66. See Donald C. Langevoort, Words from on High About Rule lOb-5: Chiarella's
History, Central Bank's Future, 20 DeL J Corp. L. 865, 869 (1995) (predicting that Central
Bank decision would be a good candidate for lower court revisionism which could have the
effect of substantially reducing the extent to which the decision changes the status quo).
67. Although few courts have experimented with other approaches, there are
alternatives to both the bright line approach articulated in Wright and imposing liability
based upon a sufficient degree of participation. It is possible, for example, to analogize to
the Supreme Court's analysis in Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988). In Pinter, the Court
rejected the idea that primary liability as a seller under section 12 of the Securities Act of
1933 was limited to the owner of a security. Instead, the Court extended primary liability
to include those who solicit the purchase of securities if they are motivated, at least in part,
by a desire to serve their own financial interests or those of the issuer. See id. at 642-47. A
court could similarly predicate primary liability under section IO(b) on the defendant's
financial interest, as well as participation, in the fraudulent transaction.
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gress overrode President Clinton's veto and adopted the Private Securi
ties Litigation Reform Act.68

The Reform Act contained a variety of

procedural and substantive reforms designed to reduce the volume of
private securities fraud litigation and to curb l itigation abuse. These re
forms included a heightened pleading standard, a safe harbor for for
ward-looking statements , and the creation of a lead plain tiff to monitor
li tigation decisionmaking. 69
The Reform Act directly addressed liability of secondary defendants
in several ways. First, section

201 of the Reform Act7° replaced j oi n t and

several liability with a "fair share" system of proportionate liability for de
fendants who do not have actual knowledge of a fraud. 7 1

Second, the

Reform Act restored to the SEC the authority to proceed against those
who aid and abet securities fraud.72 Significantly, however, C ongress re
j ected efforts to provide a private right of action against aiders and abet
tors.73

Third, through the adoption of section lOA, the Reform Act

broadened the duties of independent auditors by explic i tly setting forth
statutory requirements for an audit of issuer financial statements and by
requiring that auditors who detect material illegal acts take specified re
medial action.74

68. Reform Act, supra note 16.
69. SeeJill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 Ariz.
L. Rev. 533, 534-37 (1997) (describing history of the Reform Act and concerns to which it
was addressed); Joel Seligman, The Private Securities Reform Act of 1995, 38 Ariz. L. Rev.
717 (1996) (describing provisions of the Reform Act).
70. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, 758-59 (1995) (amending section 21D of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
71. The Conference Report describes this provision as addressing " [o]ne of the most
manifestly unfair aspects of the current system of securities litigation." H.R. Conf. Rep. No.
369, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 736. See also
Melissa Harrison, The Assault on the Liability of Outside Professionals: Are Lawyers and
Accountants Off the Hook?, 65 U. Cin. L. Rev. 473, 518-21 (1997) (describing
proportionate liability provision). The proportionate liability provision contains two
exceptions: 1) secondary defendants are jointly and severally liable to plaintiffs who prove
damages exceeding ten percent of their net worth and whose net worth is less than
$200,000; and 2) secondary defendants are liable for an additional payment of up to fifty
percent if another defendant is insolvent and unable to pay its respective share of damages.
See id. at 518-19.
72. See 15 U.S.C.A.§ 78t(f) (West 1997).
73. For example, Senator Bryan introduced Amendment 1474, which was designed to
overrule Central Bank and to provide for a private right of action against aiders and
abettors. See 141 Cong. Rec. S9109-9116 (daily ed.June 27, 1995). The Amendment was
rejected by Congress. See Broady R. Hodder, Note, Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank and
Its Aftermath: Securities Professionals' Ever-Changing Liabilities, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 343,
357-58 (1997) (describing defeated efforts in Congress to restore aiding and abetting
liability).
74. 15 U.S.C.§ 78j-l(a)-(b) (Supp. I 1995). The SEC subsequently adopted rules to
implement§ lOA. See Implementation of Section lOA of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, SEC Release No. 34-38387, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,743 (1997). See also Marc I. Steinberg,
Securities Law After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act-Unfinished Business, 50
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Subsequent to the adoption of the Reform Act, Congress heard com
plaints that some of the Reform Act ' s effectiveness was being un dercut by
state court litigation.75 Although the extent of the problem was seriously
disputed,76 Congress responded by passing the Securities Litigation Uni
form Standards Act of

1998, which President Clinton signed i n October

of 1 998.77 The Uniform Standards Act adopted a uniform federal stan
dard for class action litigation involving fraud in connection with transac
tions in nationally traded securities . 78 The effect of the statute was to
preempt state l aw causes of action for fraud, retaining, with certain ex
ceptions, federal liability as the exclusive remedy for investors. 79 Thus,
the Uniform Standards Act eliminated the ability of plaintiffs to avoid the
limitations of the

Central Bank decision by proceeding against secondary

defendants under state law.80
III.

QuEsTIONs

OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION-THE CoNTINUED
SIGNIFICANCE OF CENTRAL BANK

Courts and commentators have devoted little analysis to whether the
adoption of the Reform Act and the Uniform Standards Act should influ
ence the continued significance of

Central Bank. In part, this question
Central Bank decision.

depends upon understanding the rationale for the
The

Central Bank opinion claims to place primary reliance o n a narrow

interpretation of the text of section l O (b ) . This textualism is consistent
with current Supreme Court j urisprudence . 8 1 Regardless of the general
appropriateness of textualism as a m ethod of statutory interpretation,82 i t
SMU L . Rev. 9, 1 2- 1 3 ( 1 996) (describing new audit, notification and reporting
requirements imposed on auditors).
75. See, e.g., Richard H. Walker, Evaluating the Preemption Evidence: Have the
Proponents Met Their Burden?, 60 Law & Contemp. Prob. 237 ( 1 997) (describing and
evaluating arguments that effectiveness of certain Reform Act provisions was reduced by
migration of litigation to state court).
76. See id. at 248-49.
77. Pub. L. No. 1 05-353, 1 1 2 Stat. 3227 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
78. See Statement by the President, U.S. Newswire, Nov. 3, 1 998, available in 1 998 WL
1 3607 1 07 (describing effect of legislation as providing "uniform national standards" for
class actions).
79. See generally Painter, supra note 1 9 (describing effect of the Uniform Standards
Act).
80. See, e.g., Branson, supra note 20, at 1 1 6-20 (describing ways in which state law
offers broader recourse against collateral defendants than federal securities law after the
Reform Act and Central Bank) .
8 1 . See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 23, at 750 ( 1 995) (describing Court's increasing
reliance on textualism during period from 1 982 to 1 992 and reduced use of legislative
purpose and history); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L.
Rev. 621 , 624 ( 1 990) (describing Justice Scalia's "new textualism" as "the most interesting
development in the Court's legisprudence (the jurisprudence of legislation) in the
1 980s").
82. Cf. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Strict Textualism, 29 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 13 ( 1 995) (arguing
that strict textualism is both intellectually incoherent and illegitimate because it renders
the judiciary unfaithful to the legislature).
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is n o t clear that its heavy emphasis on the statutory text i s an appropriate
methodology for interpreting the federal securities laws .83

A. The Role of Textualism in Interpreting Federal Securities Law
There are several reasons to be wary of textualism in the secunt1es
area.84 First, the federal securities laws contain a number of provisions in
which the statutory text is limited and the legislative history sparse.85
This structure is partially due to the age of the legislation-m odem stat
utes frequently contain highly detailed enumeration of permitted claims,
authorized claimants, available remedies, and so forth . The evolution to
ward greater statutory detail has been influenced by Suprem e Court deci
sions that impose affi rmative drafting obligations upon Congress.86 Yet,
the federal securities laws were passed in an era that predates those obli
gations.87 As a consequence, decisions such as ]I.

Case

v.

Borak ,88 which

recognize a p rivate right of action under a statute that does n o t explicitly
provide one, reflect a common law approach to statutory i nterpretation
that is curren tly disfavored. 89
83. The Supreme Court has vacillated in its use of textualism to interpret the federal
securities laws. Compare Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985)
(textualist approach requires Court to reject sale of a business doctrine in determining
whether stock is within the statutory definition of a security) with Reves v. Emst & Young,
494 U.S. 56, 62 (1990) (declining to rely exclusively on statutory text to determine when a
note is a security).
84. In addition to the criticisms detailed here, commentators have argued that
textualism is ill-suited for securities jurisprudence because of the difficulty in identifying
the relevant statutory text. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 82, at 22.
85. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, We Must Never Forget that It Is an Inkblot We Are
Expounding: Section 10(b) as a Rorschach Test, 29 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 41, 43 (1995)
(describing the federal securities laws, and section lO(b) in particular, as an "inkblot").
86. See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994) (refusing to
apply statute retroactively unless Congress so instructs); Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455
(1 990) (requiring express direction by Congress to override presumption of concurrent
state and federal jurisdiction over federal claims); Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,
473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985) (requiring "unequivocal expression of congressional intent" to
exercise its power under the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate state sovereign
immunity).
87. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 698-99 (1979) (recognizing
that analysis of whether Congress intended to create a private right of action must consider
contemporary legal context, and that for statutes passed during an era in which courts
consistently found implied remedies, it is appropriate to presume that Congress expected
the statutes to be interpreted in conformity with that approach); see also Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 381 (1982) (implying a private right
of action under the Commodity Exchange Act on the theory that such a remedy was
intended by the Congress that enacted the statute as a result of the contemporary legal
context); Eisenberg, supra note 82, at 38 (arguing that strict textualism should not be
applied to statutes that were drafted when it was not the official methodology for statutory
interpretation).
88. 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (recognizing an implied private right of action under section
14 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 578 n (a) (1998)).
89. Indeed, at least one commentator has noted the irony in the Central Bank
decision's reliance on textualism to reject aiding and abetting liability and, "in the same
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Second, the statutory structure of federal securities regulation , par
ticularly the Sec uri ties Exchange Act of 1 934, has led Congress to give
little attention to weighing the policy issues inherent in securities regula
tion and itself tailoring an enforcement m echanism to address particular
ized policy obj ectives . In part, this has resulted from Congress delegating
substantial rulemaking and enforcement power90 to the Securities and
Exchange Commission.91

In retrospect, this delegation seems appropri

ate-the SEC m ay be better able to respond in a rapid and nuanced man
ner to the technical and frequen tly changing securities industry with the
tools of an administrative agency than could Congress through refine
ments to the statutory text.92 I n exercising its delegated authority, the
SEC has relied heavily upon a joint public and private system of enforce
m en t, in which private civil litigation supplements government enforce
m en t efforts.9 3 The SEC's effort to strike a balance and to maintain ap
propriate levels of enforcement accordingly bears a limited connection to
the statutory text.
Third, the unstructured nature of the federal securities laws has also
led to greater judicial activism . Congress deliberately drafted the securi
ties laws broadly to enable the regulatory scheme to address n ew develop
ments in the industry including the development of new m e thods of
fraud.94 The federal courts responded to this challenge by interpreting
the statutes in a manner that furthers Congress's remedial objectives .
The implication o f a private right o f acti o n under provisions such a s sec
tions 1 4 ( a) and 1 0 ( b) is an example of this approach; the Court's motiva
tion in

Borak was to allow p rivate litigation to supplement public e nforce

ment.95 As a result, whole areas of securities regulation h ave little or n o
origin in the text of the statute, b u t rather are the creations of federal

breath," recognizing an implied private right of action against primary violators. Ediberto
Roman, Statutory Interpretation in Securities Jurisprudence: A Failure of Textualism, 75
Neb. L. Rev. 377, 407 (1996).
90. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1050
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (describing broad congressional grant of rulemaking authority to the SEC
and citing various statutory examples); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 1984)
(explaining broad enforcement power of SEC).
91. Congress created the Securities and Exchange Commission in section 4 of the
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.§ 78d.
92. See Amy E. Fahey, Note, United States v. O 'Hagan: The Supreme Court Abandons
Textualism to Adopt the Misappropriation Theory, 25 Fordham Urb. LJ. 507, 533 (1998).
93. See Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws: Hearings on
the Impact of the Supreme Court's Decision in Central Bank Before the Subcommittee on
Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1994), available in 1994 WL 233142, at *10-11 (statement of Arthur Levitt,
Chairman, SEC) (testifying that SEC cannot pursue every violation of federal securities
laws and that private actions serve as a necessary complement to SEC enforcement
actions).
94. See Walker & Levine, supra note 27, at 4-5 (arguing that, because Congress
intentionally drafted the federal securities broadly, strict textualism is poorly suited to
interpreting them).
95. See Tamar Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 Va. L. Rev. 553, 557 (1981).
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common l aw.96 Private civil liability under section l O ( b ) and insider trad
i n g liabili ty are two prominent examplesY7 Given the extent to which

j udicial lawmaking has occupied the field of securities regulati o n , con
gressional fine-tuning is virtually i mpossible unless Congress accepts the
legal fram ework created by the courts.98

I n fact, Congress appears to

have done so; in adopting subsequent amendments to the federal securi
ties laws, Congress has repeatedly expressed i ts approval of the courts '
decisions in these areas.99
These concerns, and others, support the Supreme Court's earlier ap
proach to interpreting the federal securities l aws-an approach consis
ten t with the recognition of an implied private right of action for federal
securities fraud. The Court' s original approach-whether described as
purposivist,

intentionalist

or

structuralist-was

characterized

by

the

Court's willingness to inform its interpretatio n by policy argume nts as
well as text and legislative history. 1 0°

Central Bank has been widely cited as demonstrating the current
Court's commitment to strict textualisrn and rej ecti o n of interpretive
principles that incorporate policy arguments. Recent Supreme Court de

Central Bank decision may be m ore of
In Gustafson v. Alloyd Co. , for
example, which was decided only a year after Central Bank, the m aj ority

cisions, however, suggest that the

an aberration than it initially appeared.

opinion purported to use a textualist analysis, yet rej ected the explicit
statutory definition of a prospectus as inconsistent with legislative in
tent. 1 0 1 As the dissenters i n

Gustafson pointed out, although it claims to

apply textualism, the majority's opinion can only be explained on policy
grounds. 1 02 Indeed, commentators have criticized the Court's tortured
effort to manipulate the statutory text as a threat to the very coh erence of
96. See Steven The!, Section 1 2 ( 2) of the Securities Act: Does Old Legislation
Matter?, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 1 1 83, 1 1 98 ( 1 995) (arguing that recent securities legislation
"can fairly be read" as congressional delegation of broad law-making authority to courts) .
97. See Steve The!, Statutory Findings and Insider Trading Regulation, 50 Vand. L.
Rev. 1 09 1 , 1 1 34 ( 1 997) ("The judge-made law of rule lOb-5 has already largely supplanted
enacted statutes as the primary vehicle of securities regulation.").
98. See id.
99. See The!, supra note 96, at 1 200 ("In the Sanctions Act, the Enforcement Act and
the limitations legislation, Congress has acknowledged that the courts make the law of
private liability for securities fraud and established a regime that contemplates the courts'
continuing to do so.") .
1 00. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 323-33 ( 1 994)
(describing different methodologies of statutory interpretation employed by the Court) .
1 0 1 . 5 1 3 U.S. 561 , 581-82 ( 1 995) (reasoning from legislative history that Congress
did not intend to extend liability under section 1 2 (2) to every private or secondary sale of
securities, despite statutory language suggesting such a result) .
102. See id. a t 594 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The majority's analysis of § 1 2 (2) is
motivated by its policy preferences.") ; id. at 596 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing
majority for statutory construction supported by "impressive policy reasons" but
inconsistent with "statute's defining text") ; see also id. at 590-01 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(criticizing majority opinion's methodology as inconsistent with the approach taken in
Central Bank) .

I
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the statutory structure . 1 03 Nonetheless, even critics of the Court's m eth
odology concede that, from a policy perspective, the decision reached the
correct result. 1 04 Accordingly, despite the obvious differences between
section

12 ( 2 ) , the statutory provision at issue in Gustafson, and section
10 (b) , the decision m ay signal the Court's willingness to abandon a textu

alist result that is inconsistent with the logic of the regulatory structure or
industry practice . 1 05
Subsequently, the Court more candidly rej ected s trict textualism in
analyzing the application of section 1 0 ( b ) to insider trading. In United
States v. O 'Hagan, 1 0 6 the Supreme Court refused to use either the m eth
odology of

Central Bank or the language of section 10 ( b ) as a basis for

rej ecting the misappropriation theory. 1 07 D espite the seeming suitability
of

Central Bank to the question of whether m isappropriation is within the

scope of conduct regulated by section 10 ( b ) , the Court did not use the
scope of conduct test in its analysis. In addition, and more importantly,
the

O 'Hagan Court distinguished the Central Bank decision on the

grounds that it was addressed to private l i tigation 1 08 and m o tivated by
policy considerations . 1 09 Thus,

O 'Hagan suggests that the Court may be

reconsidering the validity of strict textualism within the context of securi
ties jurisprudence. 1 1 0

103. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1994 Term-Leading Cases, 1 09 Harv. L. Rev.
1 1 1 , 336-39 ( 1 995).
104. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Securities Act Section 1 2 ( 2 ) Mter the Gustafson
Debacle, 50 Bus. Law. 1 23 1 , 1 270 ( 1 995 ) ; The Supreme Court, 1 994 Term-Leading
Cases, supra note 1 03, at 338-39 (acknowledging that "majority's ultimate holding . . . is
widely perceived to be beneficial for policy reasons").
1 05. See, e.g., Therese Maynard, A Requiem: Reflections on Gustafson, 57 Ohio St.
L.J. 1 327 ( 1 996) (describing and criticizing the Gustafson Court's disregard for the
statutory language and structure); Brian E. Burns, Comment, Red Means Green: The
Disruption of the Statutory Construction Process in Gustafson to Harmonize Section 1 2 (2)
and Rule 1 0b-5 Private Liability Actions Under the Federal Securities Laws, 57 Ohio St. LJ.
1 365, 1 389 ( 1 996) (describing Gustafson as "a structural approach, 'dynamic' approach, or
some unconventional variation of a conventional textual approach" and as "a drastic
departure from the Court's consistently literal plain meaning approach in construing the
federal securities laws").
1 06. 5 2 1 U.S. 642 ( 1 997).
107. See, e.g., Walker & Levine, supra note 27, at 5 ( describing O 'Hagan decision as a
retreat from the textual analysis of Central Bank) ; Fahey, supra note 92, at 530 (arguing that
O 'Hagan decision was based on purposivism, not textualism).
108. See O 'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 664 (" Central Bank' s discussion concerned only private
civil litigation under § 1 0 (b) and Rule 1 0b-5, not criminal liability."). The O 'Hagan
decision's quote from page 173 of the Central Bank decision is telling: "We have refused to
allow [private] 1 0b-5 challenges to conduct not prohibited by the text of the statute." Id.
at 651. The O 'Hagan Court inserts the word "private."
1 09. Id.
1 1 0. See, e.g., Walker & Levine, supra note 27, at 21. Walker and Levine argue that
O 'Hagan confirms that Central Bank has not ushered in the revolution in the
interpretation of the securities laws that some have proclaimed. The mere fact
that a specific fraudulent practice, such as insider trading, is not literally
prohibited by the text of section lO(b) does not mean, under Central Bank, that
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B . Legislative Ratification or Acquiescence

Even if the lower courts reject a strong textualist approach, they may
nonetheless be reluctant to rely heavily on the recent legislation in inter
preting the scope of outside professional liability. The Supreme Court
has repeatedly refused to consider subsequent legislative developments in
interpreting the scope of a statute. l 11 Indeed, in Central Bank, the Court
explicitly rejected the argument that Congress's adoption of several
amendments to the federal securities laws after courts widely interpreted
section 10 (b) to provide a cause of action for aiding and abetting securi
ties fraud was evidence that Congress acquiesced m these
interpretations. 1 1 2
Commentators typically proffer two bases upon which to consider
subsequent legislation: ratification and acquiescence. Ratification re
quires affirmative action by Congress. This action can arguably range
from Congress reenacting the statute in question and explicitly adopting
the courts' interpretation, to Congress adopting a subsequent statute that
builds upon the structure established by the interpretation, to a congres
sional vote that defeats a proposed amendment to overturn the interpre
tation.113 The strongest argument in favor of ratification characterizes
Congress's action as an adoption of the courts' interpretation of the stat
ute and an incorporation of that interpretation into law. The counter
argument is that, for this adoption to have the effect of lawmaking, it can
only be achieved through the formal legislative process.
It is more difficult to justify reliance on congressional acquiescence
as a basis for referencing subsequent legislation because it is, in effect,
reliance on congressional silence or inaction. The argument is that when
Congress amends a statute that has been previously interpreted by the
courts without revising the statute to modify the courts' interpretation,
the amendment constitutes implicit approval of those aspects of the inter
pretation that have not been changed. As the Court and commentators
have observed, the vagaries of the legislative process make it difficult to
ascertain the causes of congressional inaction. This makes it hazardous
to use inaction as an indication of congressional intent. 1 1 4
the practice does not violate section 1 0 (b) 's broad prohibition against
manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances.
I d.
1 1 1 . See, e.g., Pub. Employees Retirement Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 1 58, 1 68
( 1 989) ("We have observed on more than one occasion that the interpretation given by
one Congress (or a committee or Member thereof) to an earlier statute is of little
assistance in discerning the meaning of that statute.").
1 1 2. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
1 1 3. See, e.g., Donald R. Livingston & Samuel A. Marcosson, The Court at the
Crossroads: Runyon, Section 1981 and the Meaning of Precedent, 37 Emory LJ. 949, 970
( 1 988).
1 1 4. "Congress's failure to overturn a statutory precedent is [not] reason for this
Court to adhere to it. It is 'impossible to assert with any degree of assurance that
congressional failure to act represents' affirmative congressional approval of the Court's

I
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There i s a difference, however, between using congressional ratifica
ti on or acquiescence as a basis for adhering to a prior j udicial in terpre ta
tion of a statute and looking to subsequent legislation for in terpre tive
guidance . 1 1 5 This is particularly true when, as in the present case, the
s ubsequent legislation both provides affirmative evidence of the congres
sional obj ectives behind the regulatory scheme and reconfigures that
scheme in light of problems that had previously been identified by the
Court.

It is possible to argue-as the Court does, particularly when it

employs strict textualism-that the i n tent of the current Congress is irrel
evant to the question of how to i n terpret a statute passed a number of
years ago. l 1 6 Still, the separation of powers principles that support textu
alism also counsel deference to the legislature to resolve policy issues.
Accordingly, when a Court is engaged i n policy analysis, it seems appro
priate to consider the articulated position of Congress on the policy ques
tion involved .
Additionally, this approach provides a basis for employing t h e princi
ples behind dynamic statutory interpretation, 1 1 7 yet it grounds those prin
ciples within the constitutional structure. The Court may find it appro
priate to consider recent developments in interpreting a statute, but be
concerned about charges of activism if it relies upon its j udgment to
make policy choices. Reference to subsequent congressional i n tent with
regard to the relevant policy issues allows the Court to combine legislative
deference with a realistic approach to the issues at hand. In an area such
as securities regulation, where Congress has broadly delegated lawmaking
authority to the courts, j udicial consideration of recent legislation recon
figures the lawmaking process as more of a partnership .
IV. FuTuRE DIRECTION oN LIABILITY STANDARDs-A TRAVEL ADvrsoRY
FOR THE FEDERAL C ouRTS

As indicated above, reliance on the methodology of strict textualism

offers little guidance for lower courts in articulating a standard of primary
liability for secondary defendants. If, however, decisions such as
can properly be read as modifying the

O 'Hagan

Central Bank approach, lower

statutory interpretation." Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 1 09 S. Ct. 2363, 2371 n. 1
(1989) (quoting johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 6 1 6, 671-72 (1987) (Scalia,J.,
dissenting)). See also John C. Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search for
Legislative Intent: A Venture Into "Speculative Unrealities," 64 B.U. L. Rev. 737, 746-48
( 1 985) (explaining why it is inappropriate to rely on congressional silence or inaction as
probative of congressional intent).
1 1 5. Cf. The!, supra note 97, at 1 093-94 (arguing that Court's analysis of the
misappropriation theory of insider trading should be influenced by statutory "findings"
contained in the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1 988).
1 1 6. Cf. id. at 1 1 22 (evaluating power of Congress to decide in 1 988 what it intended
in an earlier statute).
1 1 7. See generally Eskridge, supra note 1 00 (advocating a methodology in which
statutes are interpreted in light of post-enactment developments and cunent societal
context).
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courts should be looking beyond the statutory text to answer the ques
tion. This Article advocates that courts look to the Reform Act and the
Uniform Standards Act for clarification of congressional intent.

Courts

should then formulate a liability standard consistent with the congres
sional purpose behind imposing liability on securities professionals and
the policy considerations relevant to that obj e c tive.

O 'Hagan explicitly affirms the relevance of the purposes of a statute
to its interpretation . In accepting the misappropriation theory, the Court
explained, "The theory is also well-tuned to an animating purpose of the
Exchange Act: to insure honest securities m arkets and thereby p ro m o te

Virginia Bank
Sandberg that "where a legal structure of private statutory

investor confidence . " 1 1 8 Similarly, the Court indicated in

shares, Inc.

v.

rights has developed without clear indications of congressional intent,
the contours of that structure need n o t be frozen . . . . " and that, in such a
case, it is appropriate to look to policy reasons for deciding where the

O 'Hagan's
Central Bank as predicated upon policy considerations,

" outer limits" of the cause of action should lie . 1 1 9 In light of
characterization of

subsequent courts should use these policy considerations to inform their
in terpretation of

Central Bank, and hence the scope of primary liability.

The policy issue that concerned the

Central Bank Court was the risk

of abusive litigation . 1 20 The Court found that section I O (b) presented a
particular risk of excessive and vexatious litigation, and the Court identi
fi e d a specific problem in the imposition of 1 0 (b ) liability upon secon
dary actors. 1 2 1 Outside professionals, the Court feared, were required to
expend large sums in defense even in cases in which their involvement in
the transaction was minima1 . 1 22 Moreover, the Court warned that the liti
gation costs incurred by these outside professionals could be passed on to
clients . l 23
These observations are clearly relevant in formulating a liability stan
dard for secondary defendants . Ye t, the litigation structure that led to
the concerns identified in

Central Bank has been significantly altered by

subsequent legislative reform. At first blush, the tenor of the subsequent
legislation seems to support the argument that the scope of liability for
secondary defendants should be drawn narrowly.

As the

Central Bank

Court observed, an expansive liability standard would subj ect outside pro
fessionals to more extensive litigatio n . 124 The Court viewed this exposure
as undesirable . 1 25 Both the Reform Act and the Uniform S tandards Act
indicate a similar congressional mindset; the statutes demonstrate the de-

118.
119.
1 20.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654 (1997).
501 U.S. 1083, 1104-05 (1991).
See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate, 511 U.S. 164, 189 (1994).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

l
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I
j

<

l
l

I
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sire to reduce the scope of private securities fraud litigation generally and
the exposure of collateral defendants in particular.
gress seems to have concurred in the
refusal to reverse the

Additionally, Con

Central Bank result by its explicit

Central Bank decision and thereby reinstate aiding

and abetting liability in private litigation.
Upon further analysis, however, the significance of the subsequent
legislation appears more ambiguous. Although Congress refused to re
store aiding and abetting liability, it clearly anticipated the continued lia
bility of secondary defendants when it adopted the Reform Act provision
establishing proportionate liability.

Proportionate liability rules are of

limited importance unless the general standard of liability h olds collat
eral defendants responsible for securities fraud . 1 26 Moreover, the Re
form Act goes further with respect to accountants by imposing o n them
an affirmative obligation to report their clients ' wrongdoing. 127 By estab
lishing this whistleblowing obligation, Congress directly rej ected the posi
tion of courts that held, even

pre- Central Bank, that silence or inaction

was an insufficient basis for the imposition of liability upon secondary
defendants. 1 28
The significance of the Reform Act extends beyond the p rovisions
that deal explicitly with secondary defendants. Indeed, the primary ob
jective of the Reform Act-reduction of vexatious litigation-is the aspect
of the Act most relevant to determining the standards of liability for
outside professionals. As i ndicated above,

Central Bank was motivated by

the belief that securities li tigation posed a particular risk to secondary
defendants of vexatious litigation, and that such litigation caused undesir
able pressure to settle frivolous cases and imposed socially undesirable
costs upon professionals that might ultimately be borne by their cli
ents . 129 This same concern was Congress ' s rationale for adopting the Re
form Act. 1 30 If, however, the Reform Act effectively reformed p rivate se
curities litigation to reduce

or eliminate the

problem

of vexatious

litigation, the adoption of the Reform Act may have removed the j ustifica
tion proffered in

Central Bank for narrowing the scope of secondary de-

126. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open Market Securities
Fraud, 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 639, 640 (1996) (describing proportionate liability as "a centerpiece
proposal for reform, but largely as a mechanism for benefiting the collateral participant
(usually accountants and lawyers) ").
127. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995§ 301, Pub. L. No. 1 04-67,
109 Stat. 737, 762-64 ( adding § l OA to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78a).
128. Cf. Jeanne Calderon & Rachel Kowal, Auditors Whistle an Unhappy Tune, 75
Denv. U. L. Rev. 419, 430-31 (1998) (arguing that Reform Act's creation of new disclosure
obligations for accountants may impose sufficient duty to impose liability for failure to
blow the whistle on client fraud).
129. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 189.
1 30. See Harrison, supra note 71, at 533.
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Central Bank

may no longer j ustify the result.
This possibility is particularly important because the

Central Bank de

cision i tself recognized that choosing an appropriate liability rule creates
a tension between two competing objectives:

protecting the ability of

outside professionals to serve their clients and protecting investors. As
the

Central Bank Court noted, expansive liability for securities p rofession

als raises concerns about abusive litigation , and the costs and settlement
pressures associated with such litigati on . 1 32 These costs may b e passed on
to the client and may ultimately prevent some clients from obtaining the
benefit of professional services. Without the assistance of outside p rofes
sionals to explain disclosure requirements, formulate appropriate lan
guage, review documentation for consistency with industry standards, and
so forth, issuers would be less able to meet the regulatory disclosure stan
dards. In addition, the risk of litigation may cause outside p ro fessionals
to perform their services in a way that minimizes their liability exposure
at the expense of more complete service to the client. I t is necessary for
outside professionals to become intimately involved in the disclosure pro
cess in order to serve their clients effectively. A liability rule that encour
ages professionals to limit their participation in preparing client disclo
sure may therefore undercut the disclosure process. 1 33 These problems
can directly undermine the obj ective of federal securities regulati o n : ful l
and fair disclosure o f all material information . 1 34
At the same time, the securities disclosure system is premised upon
the supposition that outside professionals will be involved in the disclo
sure process . The statutory scheme relies, in part, on this involvement as
a substitute for greater supervision by government regulators. 1 35 Inves
tors also view the involvement of reputable professionals as a signal that
the issuer's disclosure is reliable. l 3 6 Outside professionals thus fun ction
as gatekeepers who prevent improper transactions from obtaining the ap
pearance of regularity necessary to attract investment funds. This struc
ture may be efficient in that outside professionals may be m ore readily
1 3 1 . Indeed, the advent of legislative reform may remove the justification for the
Supreme Court's general use of textualism to narrow the scope of private securities
litigation.
1 32. See Central Bank, 5 1 1 U.S. at 1 89 .
1 33. See City Bar Amicus Brief i n Klein, supra note 64, at 1 3- 1 4 (explaining that
inappropriate liability standard could interfere with the effectiveness of the disclosure
process).
1 34. See, e.g., Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 68 1 , 687 ( 1 985) (describing
Congress's remedial purpose of providing full and fair disclosure in enacting the federal
securities laws).
1 35. See, e.g., City Bar Amicus Brief in Central Bank, supra note 25 (describing
gatekeeping role of outside professionals in assuring proper functioning of federal
securities laws and investor reliance upon that role).
1 36. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 5 1 , at 386 (" [I]t is the securities lawyer who
controls the disclosure process and who undertakes to align the interests of the client
issuer with the client's investors.").
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able to access client information than regulators. Lax liability standards
interfe re with the incentive of professionals to perform this gatekeeping
fun ction by allowing professionals to sacrifice investor protection in favor
of maintaining a relationship with unscrupulous clients .
Although the Court in

Central Bank left open the door with respect

to liability of outside professionals, the decision demonstrated a j udicial
inability or unwillingness to attempt to balance these policy concerns. I n
formulating a rule of primary liability for secondary defendants, lower
courts may be able to address this omission and to effect a compromise
between the two competing goals. With the adven t of legislative reform,
the courts' task is simplifi e d . To the extent that the Reform Act has re
duced the exposure of outside professionals to vexatious litigation, 1 3 7
courts have the l eeway to adopt a liability rule that places greater empha
sis on the gatekeeping function without subj ec ting p rofessionals to exces
sive litigation risk.
Moreover, the structure of the Reform Act suggests that Congress
intended for the courts to perform this function. Rather than s pecify the
circumstances under which outside p rofessionals should be liable in pri
vate litigation, Congress adopted a framework under which the courts are
required to make this determination on a case-by-case basis. Accordingly,
although Congress has endorsed liability for secondary defe n dan ts, the
Reform Act leaves for the courts the j ob of fi ne-tuning such liability con
sistent with the statutory goals that place primary importance on full and
fair disclosure1 38 and the protection of investors. 1 39
The recent adoption of the Uniform Standards Act lends additional
support to this position. Although the Reform Act reduced the liability
exposure of secondary defendants under federal law, it was still possible
for plaintiffs to bring state court actions based upon state blue sky laws or
common law fraud. Many states applied generous liability rules to j oint
tortfeasors that could undercut the protection of the proportio nate liabil
ity provision . 140 Indeed, immediately after the adoption of the Reform
Act, plaintiffs filed a number of securities fraud suits in state court, pre1 37. Early analyses suggest that the Reform Act is effectively achieving this result. For
example, the SEC's preliminary post-Reform Act statistics revealed a dramatic decline in
the number of outside professionals named as defendants in securities fraud litigation.
See Richard H. Walker et al., The New Securities Class Action: Federal Obstacles, State
Detours, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 641 , 65 1 ( 1 997) (describing statistical differences in suits filed
against accountants, attorneys, and underwriters before and after the Reform Act).
1 38. See, e.g., Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78 ( 1 977)
(primary purpose of federal securities laws is to implement "a philosophy of full
disclosure").
1 39. See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 1 80, 1 86 ( 1 963)
(holding that one of the principal purposes of federal securities regulation is protection of
investors).
1 40. See, e.g., Thomas W. Antonucci, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
and the States: Who Will Decide the Future of Securities Litigation?, 46 Emory LJ. 1 237,
1 253-54 ( 1 997) (describing how state law, which generally provides for joint and several
liability, allows plaintiffs to avoid the proportionate liability limitation of the Reform Act)
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sumably for the purpose of exploring the extent to which state court<; and
state law offered a viable subs titute for federal securities l i tigation . 1 4 1
These suits did n o t appear, however, t o b e efforts t o circumven t the pro
portionate liability provision of the Act. 1 42
The Uniform Standards Act effectively eliminates this substi tute liti
gati o n .

By p roviding exclusive federal court j urisdiction for all p rivate

class action litigation arising from fraudulent securities transactions, the
Act secures the previously adopted litigation reforms for secondary de
fendants in virtually all cases involving large scale damage c l ai m s . Thus,
the Uniform Standards Act supplemen ts the Reform Act in p roviding
more complete application of the provisions aimed at reducing vexatious
l i tigati o n . At the same time, the Uniform Standards Act ensures that the
federal courts will be the ultimate authority on the circumstances under
which it is appropriate to hold secondary defendants accoun table . 1 43
As a consequence of the recent legislation, courts that curren tly are

faced with the question of how to determine the scope of l i ability for
outside professionals have information available beyond the original text
of section lO ( b ) to assist them in that task. Congress has explicitly stated
that it is appropriate to impose liability on lawyers, accountants, and in
vestment banks, and that such liability is consistent with the purposes of
the statute .

Indeed, Congress has affirmed the propriety of imposing

such liability within the context of p rivate civil l i tigation . The rece n t leg
islation indicates congressional desire to have outside professional s serve
a gatekeeping role i n the securities industry. Appropriate l i ability rules
further that obj ective.

Finally, the legislative structure authorizes the

141. See, e.g., Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State
Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 273 (1998) (describing various post
Reform Act empirical studies measuring increase in state court securities litigation and
explaining how state court suits could allow plaintiffs to avoid some of the reforms adopted
by the Reform Act).
142. See Walker, supra note 137, at 678 (observing that initial state court suits filed
after the Reform Act did not seem to be aimed at "peripheral deep pocket defendants").
143. A distinct component of the Uniform Standards Act further supports reading it
as a congressional affirmation of broad judicial lawmaking authority. The Reform Act
raised some question about whether Congress intended to change the judicially developed
standard for establishing scienter under section 10 (b). See Robert A. Prentice, The Future
of Corporate Disclosure: The Internet, Securities Fraud, and Rule 10b-5, 47 Emory LJ. 1,
50-51 (1998) (discussing judicial disagreement over whether Reform Act eliminated
liability for reckless conduct). In response to concerns expressed by the SEC, Congress
expressly stated in the legislative history of the Uniform Standards Act that it did not
intend to change the recklessness standard. See The Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1988, S. Rep. No. 105-182, at 4 (1998) (" [T]he Committee emphasizes
that the clear intent in 1995 and our continuing intent in this legislation is that neither
PSLRA nor S. 1260 in any way alters the scienter standard in federal securities fraud
suits."); Rachel Witmer, Litigation Reform: SEC Throws Weight Behind Reform Bill, 30
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 477 (1998) (describing congressional response to SEC's
concerns). Notably, rather than adopting its own substantive standard, Congress again
expressed its approval of the standard crafted by the federal courts.
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courts to develop those liability rules and, in so doing, to consider the
objectives and policies inherent in federal securities regulation.
Acknowledging the significance of the recent legislation does not
free the lower courts from hard choices. It does, however, suggest that
some lower courts such as the Second Circuit in Wright are taking an
unnecessarily restrictive approach by requiring that a defendant actually
make a fraudulent statement in order to incur primary liability. Even
decisions like Klein, which rely on a broad conception of who is a speaker,
may have been unduly constrained by the effort to limit primary liability
to defendants who are the speakers or authors of misleading statements.
Such a liability rule does not recognize the substantial and important role
played by securities professionals in the preparation of disclosure docu
ments. Nor does it take cognizance of the importance of encouraging a
close and candid relationship between the professional and his client.
Finally, the liability rule fails to consider the importance of securities pro
fessionals as gatekeepers and effectively allows unscrupulous professionals
to insulate themselves from liability at the expense of investor protection.
As future courts struggle to answer the questions left unresolved by Cen
tral Bank, the foregoing policies should enable them to formulate a stan
dard more faithful to the statutory purposes.
This conclusion is strikingly consistent with William Cary's vision of
the appropriate role for the federal courts in interpreting the federal se
curities laws. Decisions written by Cary on behalf of the SEC, such as the
Cady, Roberts decision, 1 44 as well as the SEC's advocacy position in cases
like Borak, 1 45 illustrate Cary's view that the federal courts should interpret
the federal securities laws broadly to further the remedial goals of inves
tor and market protection. Cary's legacy continues to be felt, as the fed
eral courts have become entrenched in the role of developing the federal
securities laws and, in many cases, have accepted Cary's ideas about the
appropriate statutory goals. Cary's legacy gave federal securities regula
tion a structure that maintains a delicate balance between investor protec
tion and excessive liability exposure. Recent legislation demonstrates a
congressional commitment, in large part, to the contours of that balance,
and to the preservation of the regulatory structure envisioned by Cary.
To the extent that Central Bank's textualist approach argues against this
structure, it threatens the fundamental policy objectives of the securities
laws.
CONCLUSION

Although the Court has never formally repudiated its decision in JI.
Case v. Borak, since that time it has retreated from the general approach
espoused by William Cary, both by reducing its willingness to recognize
implied private rights of action and by rejecting its formerly expansive
1 44. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 ( 1 96 1 ).
1 45. J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 ( 1 964).
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remedial interpretation of the federal securities l aws in favor of greater
adherence to the statutory text.
reached a peak in the

The Court ' s strict textualist approach

Central Bank decision, in which the Court con

cluded that the statute failed to provide a private right of action agai nst
those who aid and abet securities fraud.
The

Central Bank Court left to lower courts the task of developing

standards for when secondary defe ndants could nonetheless be held lia
ble as primary violators, and the challenge of formulating such standards

Central Bank decision. Although Central
Bank seemed to direct courts to take a narrow approach, subsequent

within the parameters of the

Supreme Court decisions and, m ore importantly, recent legislatio n sug
gest a return to the remedial principles espoused by Chairma n Cary. The

1995 and the
1998 should be read as explicit congressional

adoption of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
Uniform Standards Act of

endorsem ents of private securities l i tigation. Moreover, the recent legis
lation clearly demonstrates Congress's recognition that, despite some
problems that can be addressed through legislative reform, p rivate l itiga
tion, including claims of private civil liabili ty of secondary defe ndants,
remains an important tool for deterring fraud and protecti n g i nvestors i n
the U . S . securities markets. I n addressing the scope o f liability for secon
dary defendants, the courts should not sacrifice these concerns in favor of
rigid adherence to the statutory text.

•

